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E3EMSECC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 4 Plaintiff, 5 05 Civ. 5231 (RJS) v. 6 ALBERTO WILLIAM VILAR and GARY 7 ALAN TANAKA, 8 Defendants. 9 New York, N.Y. March 14, 2014 10 3:45 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 13 District Judge 14 APPEARANCES 15 MARK D. SALZBERG 16 NEAL RALPH JACOBSON Attorneys for Plaintiff 17 VIVIAN SHEVITZ Attorney for Defendants 18 19 20 ALSO PRESENT: IAN J. GAZES KATHERINE BUCHANAN 21 ANDREA LIKWORNIK WEISS EDWARD T. SWANSON 22 PAULA K. COLBATH JULIAN W. FRIEDMAN 23 24 25

1 (Case called) MR. JACOBSON: Neal Jacobson and Mark Salzberg on 2 3 behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission. THE COURT: Good afternoon. I'll do the defendants 4 and then I'm come to the receiver. For the defendants. 5 MS. SHEVITZ: Vivian Shevitz for both defendants David 6 7 Berger for Mr. Laros who is not able to be here today. THE COURT: Good afternoon to each of you. I hope 8 9 your wrist is all right. 10 MS. SHEVITZ: For the record, not so great. 11 gesture --12 THE COURT: The thumbs down gesture. You look well. 13 MS. SHEVITZ: I made it anyway. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. 15 Mr. Vilar and Tanaka. Good afternoon. Then the receiver is here as well. 16 17 MR. JACOBSON: Yes, your Honor. MR. GAZES: Good afternoon, your Honor, Ian Gazes. 18 THE COURT: There is a number of number of others who 19 20 are here today. I think my law clerk has canvassed who is 21 here. Many of you have, either yourself or through counsel, 2.2 made submissions.

MS. SHEVITZ: Can I just put on the record for all the other people, so I have it for the record. I don't really know who is here and I'd like to have it on the record.

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THE COURT: It's a public forum, so I don't think people have to identify themselves for being here. There is a number of people who have made submissions. Those have been docketed. There are a number of folks who have indicated they wish to be heard today, and so I think we should identify them. My law clerk took the appearances. It's six people. The individuals, mostly attorneys, but I think at least nonattorney-s, who have spoken to my law clerk and indicated they may wish to be heard today. If you could just identify yourselves for the record.

John, read off the names and who they represent.

THE LAW CLERK: Andrea Likwornik Weiss, JP Morgan

Securities. Paula Colbath for the Sweetlands and Alfred

Heitkonig. Edward Swanson for Lily Cates. Julian Friedman for

Paul and Dean Marcus. Patrick Begos for the Mayers family.

And Katherine Buchanan for Robin Sayko.

THE COURT: Everyone else is welcome to be here. It's a public courtroom. So anyone who wishes to come is certainly welcome to be here. But those are the ones who indicated they may wish to be heard, and I think all or most of those have made a submission of some kind.

Mr. Heitkonig may want to appear on his own behalf.

What I propose to do is first hear from the receiver, the receiver has made a couple of motions, original, revised, and then a reply. I reviewed those. You have had the benefit

of reviewing also the objections and arguments made by others. I think you addressed most of those in your reply. If there are other things that you wish to cover, I'll give you an opportunity to do that.

Maybe we should use that lecturn over there, which has a microphone. I think there might be an advantage to that if everyone uses that. Just tilt it slightly.

MR. GAZES: Good afternoon, your Honor. I'm very pleased to be here before your Honor. Having proposed an interim distribution, I know it's been the goal of the court for some time, as well as the various parties, to finally get some funds back to the various investors. The amended motion was a thoughtful motion in consideration of many conversations with almost all of the parties here today, getting back their feedback and their thoughts in connection with what the proposed distributions should be or not be. Unfortunately, three or four of those 33 claimants have decided that a different proposed distribution should be applied, but we are all happy to be here to even be discussing a distribution process.

THE COURT: We should be clear that you're talking really about the interim distribution process, and you're at least at this point agnostic as to the final distribution process.

MR. GAZES: That's correct, your Honor.

You are correct. Most of my papers set out my position in connection with the various ideas and objections that have been filed before you. I just want to make sure that it's clear that the funds that I'm holding are in what is known as an ATGF 2 account. The investment vehicles that were utilized by the investors throughout their investments are ATGF and GFRDA. There are no investment vehicles that I can identify that were utilized for those investments. So it clearly appears to me that all funds were commingled, that despite the different investment types, everyone was similarly treated and that the proposal I made to your Honor I believe was the most fairest and most equitable proposal for this interim distribution purposes.

The only variation that I would have to that proposed distribution is the Sayko objection had argued because they were a Rhodes investment that it was unfair since their Rhodes investment was converted by the defendants to a GFRDA investment vehicle, which did not exist, according to my records, that she be treated as the other Rhodes investors that they claim would be calculated based on the time of conversion to the GFRDA. And I've thought about it and I've discussed it with my accountants and we did revise the distribution to just do that, that it did appear that it was not equitable to treat their initial investment as the Rhodes investment when in fact we had a statement from them showing the GFRDA conversion and

value of those investments. There were four investors that fall within that category, your Honor, and I do have a revised distribution which ultimately I would submit to your Honor, if you'd like me to, which reflects that revision.

Other than that, the only other issue that I wanted to bring to your attention was with JP Morgan there has been a lot of discussion that interest was not being paid on the accounts. As with my accounts now, I'm told that the commercial banks and these types of accounts do not pay interest, even if they sweep the accounts when the interest is 50 basis points or less. And that is why the bank did not pay interest on the accounts when the fed rate dropped significantly, which it still is a very low rate, no interest is paid on those accounts.

THE COURT: That's in conformity with the agreement or the contract with the bank and the account?

MR. GAZES: I don't know if it specifically provides for that, your Honor. I didn't see a provision. But counsel to the bank is here and can address that issue for your Honor. I did ask her to come down here. And after all, she is seeking to be paid their fees and expenses.

THE COURT: But interest was paid up until --

MR. GAZES: It dropped 50 basis points, your Honor.

THE COURT: Which was approximately when?

MR. GAZES: I believe it was in late 2000s.

Ms. Weiss, are you here?

MS. LIKWORNIK WEISS: I am here, your Honor.

The interest rate on the account is the opening federal funds rate minus 50 basis points. So since 2009, no interest has been earned on the accounts, given the low rate of interest, and that's why no interest has accrued after December 2008. The statements reflect that interest was credited on the accounts through the end of 2008.

THE COURT: That's an agreement that was just oral or it was part of a written agreement?

MS. LIKWORNIK WEISS: There is a provision in the contract, I believe I cite it in my letter, basically let Bear Stearns, not JP Morgan, set the interest rate. My understanding, this is an interest rate that is negotiated when the account is opened. These accounts go all the way back to the late 1980s, I believe. And I also understand that the interest rate on these accounts is generally consistent with what is paid for similar accounts of this size.

THE COURT: Great. Thank you.

MR. GAZES: I have nothing more to add at this time, your Honor, unless you have any specific questions for me about the amended motion.

THE COURT: I do have some questions. But it may be it's best for me to wait until I've heard from the other interested parties, and then maybe some of those questions will be either elaborated upon or they will be fine-tuned.

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You said there is four other investors who are similarly situated to Sayko?

> That's correct, your Honor. MR. GAZES:

THE COURT: Who are they? Do you know off the top of your head.

MR. GAZES: That would be Michael Walsh; Robin Sayko, who we discussed; Donald and Marilyn Walsh; and Patricia Cabero.

We never found an instrument for Rhodes, your Honor, and so the conversion seems to have been taken place by The claimants, from what I understand, did not even consent or know there was going to be a conversion into a GFRDA supposed investment vehicle.

THE COURT: We have Ms. Cates and Ms. Jordan have made submissions here. There is an issue as to whether they should also be treated like the rest of the investors or whether they are different because they are not, at least for some of the investments, technically GFRDA or AGTF.

MR. GAZES: Those are some of the issues that are before you. The ATGF creditors wish you to treat the interim distribution in a way that it satisfies them and the GFRDA wishes to treat it differently.

My Pooley method, which I thought was the fairest and most equitable method, was to look at the last statement of the ATGF statements, or the initial investment, whichever I had,

and attribute a value to that based on the statements and dollar amount. And the GFRDA was to use the latest statement showing accrued interest to that date and treat the interim distribution based on the amount reflected in that statement.

THE COURT: Ms. Cates is a \$5 million investment, at least one of them came out at trial, related to something different all together. And so she is not part of the calculation at all for that, right?

MR. GAZES: No. That would be incorrect. Ms. Cates was given value for the SBIC investment, I believe, is what you are referring to. As long as the claimant demonstrated money that was turned over to Amerindo, we gave the claimant a basis for a claim.

THE COURT: That's my question. That's what I want to make sure, and Jordan as well.

MR. GAZES: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I may disagree with the calculation or which of the methods that has been set forth, but they are a part of your calculation.

MR. GAZES: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And then I want to ask you at some point about the risk of overpaying. There is a dispute, obviously, with these two valuation methods that are proposed and identified in your two motions. Have consequences, at least they look like they would have consequences to the long-term or

to the final distribution.

This is really about the interim distribution. And so is there a concern that by adopting one over the other we would be paying out more to certain investors than would be appropriate at the end of the day if we then did a different calculation? Mr. Marcus has sort of laid out his view as to what we ought to be doing with what's left over. If there is a surplus, then who gets it?

MR. GAZES: I can only give you a conjecture on how I would deal with the surplus. It seems to me that the claimants would be entitled to the surplus for certain.

THE COURT: Which claimants?

MR. GAZES: All the claimants. Each one of the investors would be entitled to share in the surplus. How we calculate how that surplus distribution would mean that we have paid them back their investment. So no particular credit would be harmed by the interim distribution because it's really only their investment amount based on their latest statements that they are being paid now, so I don't believe that there would be a prejudice to them.

THE COURT: I think some of the other speakers are probably going to address that again. Maybe I'll have you come back and respond specifically to points that are raised today that are new or different from what's in their written submissions.

Has there been any attempt to calculate what Amerindo would have kept as its fees on these things?

MR. GAZES: There has not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Did SEC want to be heard now?

MR. JACOBSON: Yes, your Honor, very quickly.

THE COURT: I'll do the parties and then I'll do the claimants and the investors. I am going to give everybody sort of a tight time leash because I don't want this to go on into the wee hours. Five minutes should be enough?

MR. JACOBSON: One minute. I'm just here to let the Court know the Securities and Exchange Commission completely supports the receiver's plan as it was modified. We believe that due to the vast commingling, the use of the fund by Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka interchangeably, they took funds from certain investment vehicles, paid other investors with those monies. We don't think there is any way to really disentangle the finances of these companies, and we believe that the best method, the fairest method of distribution is in fact what the receiver has proposed and what we put in our papers, which is trying to figure out to the best ability to find out what the net claim was or the net investment was for the interim distribution. And we believe at this point that is the fairest way to make the distribution. So we do support the receiver's plan.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Shevitz, if you're more comfortable sitting, bring a microphone close. Why don't we do that.

MS. SHEVITZ: I would like an opportunity to speak after the other people speak, too.

THE COURT: Maybe. I am not sure. Unless you want to wait until they are done. I am not giving everybody two innings.

MS. SHEVITZ: We are parties here. Outsiders are speaking and I would like an opportunity to respond to them.

Now we have a new valuation and new thing that I have not even seen yet that he is proposing. I have not seen any of this.

THE COURT: I'm not guaranteeing you that I'm going to give you a chance to respond to everybody. If you want to wait until everybody else has gone, we can do it that way.

MS. SHEVITZ: I would like to say something now. I may ask again for an opportunity to respond to other people who are saying different things about these claims here.

THE COURT: You can sit, if you want to sit. Keep the microphone close so we can hear you.

MS. SHEVITZ: Mr. Gaze said that he spoke to everybody and that's how he developed his numbers. He did not speak to us. He did not look at the record.

On February 21, 2012, you and Judge Swain signed an order that told the government to come up with the most recent

account balances based on the relevant account statement and other information based on the investments. These were not vastly commingled. The mutual fund was commingled. Yes.

That's how mutual funds are operated.

The GFRDAs were also commingled, as is proper in Panama. There was nothing commingled with the U.S. entity at all. That was all totally separate. And in 2005, 12/2005, the SEC monitor gave the U.S. Amerindo a total clean bill of health. There was zero commingled between the U.S. and the Panama operation, zero.

On February 12, you and Judge Swain told the SEC and the prosecutors to submit the value of substitute assets. This is February 2012, document 512. This happens to be in the criminal case, but it was the two captions. Specifying the account balances, the account statements.

Mr. Gazes and the SEC take the position now that the papers are in disarray. They are not. They didn't look at them. The only thing that happened was there was some irregular account statements, but the Amerindo Panama accounts were kept perfectly validly.

After this order, Sharon Levin looked at them, as did Marc Litt, in document 418-2, also filed as 514-5. These contained account statements and other information about the claims, as well as the assets at that time. Mr. Litt was able to do that. The documents are not in disarray. They just were

disregarded. The government has disregarded every single order by this court, by Judge Swain, that says give me the accounts and the account statements. They are not in disarray. They were some of these statements that went to the clients were irregular, but the larger clients got theirs, their statements, and there is nothing in disarray. The commingling doesn't stop a valid -- I'm sorry. I'm a little Percoceted up.

THE COURT: You can sit, if you want.

MS. SHEVITZ: I don't know if that's going to get my words back.

The fact of the records. One of the things that Mr. Gazes said is everyone is similarly treated. No. Everyone's account was kept according to an account that is maintained, was maintained, and it is in the search records that Sharon Levin told Judge Swain on 9/23/2011, the transcript is I believe document 168. I don't know. I cited it in my papers. All of the documents are there. Judge Swain said come up with those. And the government and the SEC -- the SEC has repeatedly failed to comply with these repeated orders of the Court. There is nothing inascertainable about it. Not everyone was similarly treated. Everybody was treated according to their account and their particular vehicle and their particular deal with Amerindo with an account interest amount that was negotiated. It dropped when the market rate dropped. They were all respected. Mr. Heitkonig, for

instance, started out with 13 percent and by the time of the 2005, interest rates had dropped, but it's on his account statement, which I've attached in our papers. Everything is accounted for. They just didn't look at it. It is there.

The government, Sharon Levin, told Judge Swain on 9/23/11, we have the records there. We have them pursuant to the search. The government maintains the Amerindo Panama records and if someone would look at them, they are not in disarray, and they were told to provide those. Now they want to come up with some different evaluation that keeps changing, and I don't know quite how to do it. The investors were not treated similarly. They were treated in accordance with their own investments.

JP Morgan. I don't know if it's a matter of contract, they say, this paying interest. Well, the funds should have been swept into a money market fund. That was the deal with JP Morgan. It just happened after they, the SEC, put them out of business and took their ability to direct JP Morgan away. JP Morgan did whatever it wanted. Now nobody even knows if it's a matter of contract, but they want to collect fees on that. There is something not fair here.

When Rhodes finished, the investors knew that if they wanted to keep their money in Amerindo it was going to be in a different — they called it vehicle. Lily Cates, who was dyslexic, didn't know how to call everything a different

vehicle, so she kept calling her account Rhodes. But it really is what it is for everybody. It is on the records, it is validly treated, it is there. It's not unascertainable. It's totally ascertainable. Not only that, all the money we find now is there and there were really no losses based on the 2005 account statements.

Now, eight years later, nine years later, when the government has refused to come up with the account statements before, and still refuses to, as if it's not their job. But, your Honor, you signed something, a document telling them to do that, on February 5, 2012, as did Judge Swain. This has never been complied with.

If there is a surplus, what do we do about it? If there is a surplus, my clients are the claimants as well.

After they validly pay the claims based on the May 25 account, which are ascertainable, all you have to do is look at and update the account statements which were there and which relied on by Sharon Levin and by Marc Litt in the two documents I mentioned, 514-5, 221, after your Honor did sign this order, that's what they came up with, Sharon Levin did.

THE COURT: What did she come up with?

MS. SHEVITZ: She came up with a listing of documents at document 514 of accounts, of amounts, of what they knew then subject to verification. In 514-5, right after your Honor and Judge Swain issued this order. They came up with amounts.

They came up with the account statements that they had. It was subject to whatever verification was going to be and nobody continued verifying it.

THE COURT: You're repeating this over and over. You were about to say that your clients are entitled to everything that's left over?

MS. SHEVITZ: The position they have taken since the beginning and to now is they want the clients paid back on the May 25 account as of the last date they were able to manage the money. Since then, nothing has earned interest.

THE COURT: Why would it go to your clients? I don't understand that, if there are shares in the ATGF account.

MS. SHEVITZ: After the ATGF was not able to be managed, the defendants had a fee interest in that. It doesn't go on when it's not managed. They were able to manage this. For instance, the UK pension — right now, since 2005, this money, there has been cash sitting in these accounts.

Nobody —

THE COURT: That's not clear to me why that makes it your client's money. I don't understand how you make that point several times in your papers. Somehow, you are arguing that your clients are the owners of what's in the ATGF account.

MS. SHEVITZ: It's not an ATGF account. The names of the bank account are different than the names of the investments. The names of the bank accounts are -- one of them

is called ATGF, Inc., one of them is called ATGF 2. They are not the investment vehicles. They are the names of bank accounts.

THE COURT: What makes your clients the owners?

MS. SHEVITZ: They are the owners of the bank accounts because they are the account owners through another corporation of the accounts at JP Morgan. They have a fee interest which was not taken out. Their fees were not taken out for years. So their fees have been an investment in the account. Their fee interest has been stayed there.

Mr. Tanaka hasn't taken a salary since 2002. While everybody else's accounts, money, was in these accounts, so was theirs. They want to pay the investors as of the May 25, 2005 last date they could manage. Since then, the interest has been stopped. Since then, JP Morgan has refused to take any direction from them. So their fee interest remains in there as claimants, the same as everybody else. And in Mr. Canute's report, the monitor who found Amerindo U.S. squeaky clean in December 2005, he resigned. He said he wanted to resign then. He told Judge Swain he should get discharged and any money left over should go to the owners. That's what happens with these.

If they were able to manage this account, like before things were shut down in 2005, at least the UK pension, they had selected stocks in the UK pension as opposed to leaving cash there. And the stocks have appreciated 332 percent since

2010. Because they were somewhat managed, not actively managed. When the government shut this down in 2005, JP Morgan stopped paying interest, JP Morgan refused to take any direction. The SEC --

THE COURT: That's not what JP Morgan is saying. They are saying they are paying interest up to 2008.

MS. SHEVITZ: It was not any negotiated interest. They wouldn't listen. They wouldn't talk to the owners of the fund. The SEC --

THE COURT: The owners of the fund being whom, your client?

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. JP Morgan did not take -- this could have been a negotiated amount. And what should have happened is the cash should have been swept into a money market account which would then -- which is what the normal -- that's what happened before. But on day one Mr. Tanaka was told he couldn't give them any direction. Mr. Salzberg was there from day one sitting in their office during the search and so nothing was able to be managed or appreciated. So everybody's money has been stifled there when it could have earned 330 percent.

THE COURT: Again, it's still not clear to me why you're asserting that your clients are the owners --

MS. SHEVITZ: Because, Judge, Amerindo management is the account owner of those accounts. That is a corporation

owned by the defendants. And, as such, and especially now that the forfeiture order is vacated, it belongs to them.

THE COURT: I don't want to do this anymore because I keep asking why you think it belongs to them and you said because it belongs to them. You have a minute, wrap it up because you are not the only one who wants to speak today. Anything else would you like to say with respect to the receiver's motion regarding the interim —

MS. SHEVITZ: I still don't know what he wants to do now. I have not seen any new thing with Rhodes. It's very hard for me to respond. It's hard for me to respond to shifting motions. I think Mr. Heitkonig said it well the other day, I don't know whose side he's on. In our papers, too, we cite Eberhard v. Marcu. A receiver stands in the shoes of the entity of which he's receiver. And Eberhard v. Marcu —

THE COURT: I'm familiar with the case.

MS. SHEVITZ: And Mr. Gazes, if he is the receiver of those funds, should have been seeking interest, should have been telling JP Morgan, sweep it into a money market fund. He is standing in there to maximize --

THE COURT: That's not really addressing what you're arguing for --

MS. SHEVITZ: My argument is that before the restraining order and before the forfeiture order, these were the account holders, Amerindo management owned by these two

individuals.

Now, there is no forfeiture order and the property is reverted. Property ownership is the right to manage. They have been deprived of that right and they are still deprived of that right. And one of the things I wanted to suggest, after an interim distribution, which we are very close to, I think. We agree, for the most part, based on the receiver's first report, except for made-up MAVs, which I have addressed, and interest rates which seem to have extended into perpetuity, which they don't because they were one-year GFRDA fixed-deposit vehicles. That is also in our papers and it is in the records, the Amerindo Panama records which Marc Litt and Sharon Levin are able to access.

THE COURT: Anything else you would like to say with respect to the proposed interim distribution?

MS. SHEVITZ: Yes. There is some investors that we had on our list, if you recall, in July 2012. We made a list. I think it was 2012. And it was based on Sharon Levin's list because we don't have the records. But based on Sharon Levin's list, we included some investors in this list which Mr. Gazes does not seem to have accounted for on his listing at all. Some of them have recently contacted me. I don't want to leave them out in the cold. On the other hand, it's hard to --

THE COURT: Notice has been given.

MS. SHEVITZ: I don't think they got it. That's the

problem. And now Mr. Gazes is allowing other claims in, after the fact. And it's not a fair process --

THE COURT: You are asking for additional people to be included. Is that what you are asking? I am not sure I'm following.

MS. SHEVITZ: I'm asking for, after there is a process to go through the Amerindo Panama accounts, I think there should be a review of this. We are willing to pay an interim payment. Yes, we are willing to do that, but not based on amounts that don't exist in the records. These are not unascertainable, Judge.

THE COURT: You have made that point. I want to hit any points --

MS. SHEVITZ: There are some additional investors that may be entitled to something and there is some investors that Mr. Gazes has seemingly accepted. For instance, Mr. Charles, who we say is a bogus investor who doesn't have a claim. Mr. Gazes has allowed his claim.

THE COURT: I have seen that.

MS. SHEVITZ: There is also some other people,
Mr. Sweetland, who we don't really know, but he doesn't even
have an affidavit. There is some people who don't have
affidavits. It seems arbitrary and capricious. And without
having a basis in the Amerindo records, which exist and Sharon
Levin told Judge Swain, are there in her custody, and should be

examined, as you said, on February 12. I don't know how to respond.

THE COURT: I want to hear from the others who were here today. Let's start with JP Morgan Chase.

Come up to the lecturn and use the microphone. Thank you, Ms. Likwornik Weiss.

MS. LIKWORNIK WEISS: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, JP Morgan has a contractual lien on these four accounts for payment of its fees and expenses and has made that claim. Three separate groups of parties have objected:

Vilar and Tanaka, the Mayers, and Mr. Marcus.

And I will start by saying they have no grounds to object. This is a contractual claim and they are not parties to the contract. Despite what Ms. Shevitz says, her clients do not own these accounts. These accounts are in corporate names. They are controlled by the receiver. The receiver has not objected to JP Morgan's request for payment under the contract. In fact, he recommends it. And for that reason alone, the Court should just direct that it be paid.

The interest claim has been amply addressed, and I would just like to address the points that Ms. Shevitz made in her papers and a little bit today regarding JP Morgan.

With respect to holding the money and not giving her clients access to it in 2005, there was a default under all of these agreements, which you would see if you read them. And

she would see if you read them.

The SEC came in and claimed securities frauds. The defendants Vilar and Tanaka were arrested. JP Morgan had broad and ample remedies at that point to prevent itself from the risk that those actions imposed. They could have shut the accounts down completely. They were completely within their rights to not allow these defendants any access to it and that is what they did.

With respect to her claim that JP Morgan has not managed the accounts, JP Morgan's job here was not to manage the accounts. It was a prime broker. It provided clearing functions. It provided financing functions. It provided services to fund managers. It was not JP Morgan's job to decide how to manage the funds.

In her papers Ms. Shevitz claimed that JP Morgan is estopped from seeking funds in this account because it filed an interpleader which it disclaimed them. As is obvious, your Honor, we claimed the attorneys fees and costs in the interpleader. We sought to get rid of these accounts through the interpleader and disclaimed only for that purpose, but disclaimed interest in the accounts while claiming our fees. What happened instead was that the Court directed us to hold them and to have the money pass through the forfeiture proceedings, so nothing has been waived.

In addition to the claims that Mr. Gazes has

submitted, legal fees continue to accrue. The last submission puts them up to about \$140,000. They continue to accrue today. We would very much like to have them stop continue accruing, but we would ask the Court to direct Mr. Gazes to pay what is owed for legal fees and costs.

And, of course, lastly, the ongoing custodial fees are a separate application, not really part of this proceeding, but JP Morgan is now the custodian, is honoring Mr. Gazes' requests on a very frequent basis, and that custodial fee should separately be paid.

Unless the Court has any questions, I have nothing further.

THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you very much.

MS. SHEVITZ: I do have --

THE COURT: No.

MS. SHEVITZ: I am not going to be able to respond at all?

THE COURT: You have to understand, this is a recurring problem. You seem to think you run this courtroom and that you speak at will and that you speak as long as you'd like even if it's just to repeat all points that you have made before. No. Stop. Enough. I think I've been very patient. But you constantly speak over me. You constantly interrupt me. You show so little respect for the Court that it's something I'm not used to and I'm not going to tolerate much longer. So

stop.

We are next going to hear from the Mayer's representative, Mr. Begos.

MR. BEGOS: Thank you, your Honor. I can tell you I'm very glad that we are here talking about any distribution of money. It's been such a long time since we thought money was going to be first distributed, and I'm glad we are finally at the cusp of a distribution.

There is a couple of points that I just want to make based on what was said so far today before I turn to the specifics of the Mayers' objections.

There has been a discussion of paying up until May 2005. As Ms. Shevitz has used that date, I know Mr. Gazes has used it for purposes of valuation for an interim distribution, and I don't think the Court understands it this way. But I just want to make sure it's on the record.

Obviously, all of the claimants are entitled to be paid up until the present. The fact that Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka were arrested and then convicted doesn't mean that the debts no longer continue to accrue interest or continue to accrue growth. So to the extent there is money left over, to the extent that there is extra money, quote unquote extra money lying around, obviously, all of the claimants should be paid 100 cents on the dollar, including whatever interest they are owed, including whatever growth they are entitled to.

The Mayers' objections really fall into a couple of parts. I think to a certain extent, to a great extent, the Mayers contend that they are really unique among the creditors, and that relates to the judgments that they have. I think the most important, the most significant objection we have here is that the receiver cannot recalculate the amounts that the Mayers have been found to be owed pursuant to their judgments.

THE COURT: You are owed that by the defendants in those cases, in the civil cases in the state. But the funds at issue here are not the same.

So you have a judgment against Mr. Vilar and Mr. Tanaka, certainly. And to the extent that they have any money coming to them at the end of this process, I guess you get dibs on it, unless there are others who also have claims against them personally. But I think this was a point that was made by Mr. Gazes in his reply, and I am not sure what your response to that would be.

MR. BEGOS: Couple of responses. We also have a judgment against Amerindo Investment Advisors, both the American and the Panama entity.

But the primary response is to look at the very appointment of Mr. Gazes to begin with. He was appointed in this case to take control of the assets that were subject to the forfeiture order. The assets that were subject to the forfeiture order on the criminal action were made subject to a

forfeiture order because the government submitted to your Honor evidence that that was property belonging to Vilar and Tanaka. That was the only basis that the Court had to make those substitute assets subject to the forfeiture order.

And I would point specifically in United States motion to amend the order of forfeiture to include substitute assets, this is document 444 from May of 2010. The government asks that the forfeiture be amended, quote, to include certain property of defendants Alberto William Vilar and Gary Alan Tanaka as substitute property. And it listed specifically the accounts that are at issue here today.

The Court then issued an order of substitute assets, that's document number 463, November 9, 2010, and included in that order a whereas clause: Whereas the government has identified the following assets as property of the defendants, and listed the accounts, and all of the other property that was turned over. Then the Court entered orders forfeiting that property.

THE COURT: The property belongs to a lot of people who are in this room, not just the Mayers. The fact that the Mayers have a judgment against the defendants doesn't mean that the property belongs to the defendants.

MR. BEGOS: What I said, your Honor, is that the government's motion for substitute assets and the Court's order of substitute assets were both based, as it had to be, on the

finding that the property at issue belonged to the defendants. The statute, it's 21 U.S.C. 853, allows for forfeiture of substitute property and states that the Court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant, so the only basis the Court had for entering an order of substitute assets in the criminal action.

THE COURT: This is not the criminal action. We are not here for the criminal action.

MR. BEGOS: I understand that, your Honor, but that's the predicate for the receivership. When the Court appointed Mr. Gazes initially to take possession of the fund, the Court identified the funds as the funds that were subject to the forfeiture in the criminal action. And then we go to the Court's order giving Mr. Gazes more control, which was the summary judgment decision. The summary judgment decision is only against Vilar and Tanaka. The Court has issued no order against ATGF 1, ATGF 2, AMI, and any of the other entities that were codefendants in this action.

Although the Court's orders in this action don't specifically say, I hereby appoint Ian Gazes as receiver for Vilar and Tanaka, I think when you look at all of the decisions, when you look at the language of all of the decisions, it's clear that Mr. Gazes has been appointed as receiver or Vilar and Tanaka.

THE COURT: I think you should move on to your next

point, because I don't think you are going to get too far on that one.

MR. BEGOS: Very well, your Honor. I will subsume the argument about the judgment lien in that as well.

I think the next primary argument relates to the difference between the victims, who are primarily GFRDA investors, although Ms. Lily Cates as well, who we didn't specifically address because her investments are different than anybody else's, versus the ATGF investors. We have spelled this out in your brief. It so happens that on various points one of the primary ATGF investors, Mr. Marcus, agrees with our position that there is a distinction between the GFRDA investors/victims and the ATGF investors.

THE COURT: You don't think the ATGF investors are victims in any sense?

MR. BEGOS: They have not been established to be victim. There was no finding that there was any fraud committed against them, certainly not in the criminal action and not in this action. Right now they are investors. They certainly have lost money, but they have not been found by anybody to be victims. The SEC, in response to our objection —

THE COURT: I don't know what it means to be found as a victim, but, again, this is a civil case. This is an SEC case.

MR. BEGOS: I misspoke. They have not found to have been victims of fraud, your Honor. The SEC has not established that the ATGF investors were defrauded. The summary judgment motion related only to what the Court referred to as the testifying victims in the criminal trial, which was primarily a subset of the GFRDA investors.

THE COURT: This is the SEC action. What we have is the receiver's report, which indicates that assets were commingled, and that some of those assets were used for purposes completely unrelated to the investments, for personal purposes. It also seems that some of those commingled assets, which is in the name of the ATGF investment vehicle, were used to pay people who were GFRDA investors. It would seem that the folks who invested in ATGF probably didn't know that their investments and the assets that were bought with those investments were going to be used to pay off other investors who were apparently in a different fund.

MR. BEGOS: That very well may be, and I'm not suggesting that they can't prove or the SEC can't prove that ATGF investors were defrauded or were misled.

Part of the point of our objection is, nobody has proved it yet. When you look at all of the cases regarding distribution in receiverships and evaluating whether people are similarly situated, it looks at whether victims of the fraud are similarly situated.

The remainder of the point relates to at what level of specificity does the Court determine that investor groups are similarly situated or not, putting the victim of fraud issue aside.

The SEC and Mr. Gazes have taken the position that initially Mr. Gazes took the position that ATGF and GFRDA investors were different.

THE COURT: I think on the basis they have different expectations.

MR. BEGOS: Correct. And we support that. And the amended motion walked that back and treated everybody the same.

Our view is, what the SEC is suggesting is all the Court needs to look at is, are they victims of fraud and was money commingled. And our view is, under the Second Circuit case law, there are other factors that the Court can and should consider. Granted, the Court has broad discretion here and virtually whatever the Court does with respect to determining whether people are similarly situated would be affirmed if anybody appealed it.

But when the Court looks at the cases that we cited, there are other factors that I think the Court should consider above and beyond just were they both victims of fraud and was money commingled. Like the relationship. Were they similarity situated in relationship to the fraud. Was the treatment of both groups the same. Were they both looking for the same

thing. Were they similarly situated in relationship to the fraudsters. And were they similarity situated in relationship to the nature of the investments. When you look at the GFRDA investments versus the ATGF investments, they were just very different vehicles. The GFRDA investments were much more like lenders. They had what were effectively certificates of deposit as if you went to a bank, you gave them money, you were earning a stated interest rate for a stated period of time, then it would mature and you would get your money back. ATGF investors were looking for speculation. That's what they wanted. That's what they got.

The documents, when you look at the claims, the documents show tremendous volatility in those accounts. We submit that those differences merit different treatment between the ATGF and the GFRDA investors.

THE COURT: This is for the interim distribution. And so does it matter for the interim distribution if we can try a different valuation once everything has been accounted for and liquidated?

MR. BEGOS: Your Honor, I certainly support getting money to people sooner rather than later, and I am certainly not going to suggest to you that the Court should spend weeks and weeks and months evaluating these claims before any money gets distributed. And I think my sense of this is, the Court wants to get this interim distribution made as soon as

possible. If it's clear that this is merely an interim distribution, that any calculation that's done now has no effect on what the final calculations are, what the final priorities are, and if, as I suspect is the case, we think that there is going to be enough money left over to address any inequalities that have arisen in the interim distribution, as I think your Honor has already floated that issue, if, I believe, Mr. Gazes has said there may be -- I could be misquoting him. He said there could be tens of millions of dollars in value in these private securities.

If there is enough there to rectify any problems in valuation, I think that the Court may very well, in its discretion, say, I am not going to look at the priority issue now. I am not going to take a fine tooth comb and look at the valuation issues now. I am going to get money out. I do still think and I know your Honor disagrees with me on that, I do still think that the Mayers' judgment needs to be given full faith and credit here and that their claim should be valued at the amount of their judgment.

With respect to --

THE COURT: Wrap it up because there is a lot of other people.

MR. BEGOS: With respect to JP Morgan, we did object to their claim to the extent they were asking for fees and expenses because, in our view, they had to pay interest. I'll

accept the representation of Ms. Weiss that interest was credited pursuant to the agreements and so I don't press that particular objection anymore. I do point out, though, that to the extent JP Morgan says they have a lien and they deserve a priority, the Mayers also contend they have a lien and they deserve a priority as well.

THE COURT: The problem is, nothing is going to be paid out if they still have the money.

MR. BEGOS: Your Honor, I think, as I said, the Court has broad discretion here and probably even more, given that we are talking about an interim distribution. I don't want to stand in the way of getting money out to the Mayers or anybody else on a quick basis.

Unless the Court has more questions for me.

THE COURT: No, I don't. Thank you very much, Mr. Begos.

Next I would like to hear from Mr. Marcus or his counsel.

Mr. Friedman.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ FRIEDMAN: Thank you and good afternoon again, your Honor.

It is true that we are talking about an interim distribution and it is true that regardless of what your Honor does with respect to the interim distribution, you can change it later.

establish a pattern for what happens here. And, more significantly, I think you can get it right without any complicating factors. I don't think this is as difficult as some of the other speakers have indicated. I think that the receiver and the SEC have thrown up their hands. The receiver and the SEC start from the premises that because the money was commingled, everybody is similarly situated. And I don't think there is any basis for that conclusion, either in fact or in law. I think the starting point has to be, what did these claimants invest in? And as several people have said, and it's really not in dispute, there are two completely different kind of investments here. GFRDA, as Mr. Begos just said, was a fixed income investment, akin to a certificate of deposit.

THE COURT: I wouldn't waste your time on that. I know the difference between the two.

MR. FRIEDMAN: ATGF, by contrast, was a mutual fund. It was an equity mutual fund. My clients bought shares in ATGF. ATGF, in turn, because the securities. Those securities could go up, those securities could go down. If they go up, the ATGF investors or the ATGF shareholders make money, just like the investors in any --

THE COURT: I get all that, believe me. This is all very salient if there is money left over. But if there is not, assume that there is only 50 cents on the dollar, and

ultimately we don't know, but it could make a difference, right?

MR. FRIEDMAN: It could make a difference, but it depends, your Honor, on what money leftover means. The way we propose, and this is set forth in detail in paragraph 32 of our original papers, and I take your Honor through the steps. And I would like to summarize --

THE COURT: I've read it. You don't have to reinvent the wheel. Go ahead.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Let me give you the 30,000-foot summary. The 30,000-foot summary is figure out what the GFRDA people are owed, which is a combination of principal and interest, figure out what is available. One has to make an assumption, because not all of the money is corralled yet by Mr. Gazes, and I will return to that issue in a second if your Honor will bear with me.

But one can assume that there is going to be a total of -- we know there are \$23 million now. Mr. Gazes has represented to me -- represented is the wrong word. Mr. Gazes has said to me in our conversations that he expects to recover \$4 million from the Cayman Islands and approximately \$45 million from the sale of the publicly-traded but still restricted securities once those restrictions are lifted.

If we assume that there is going to be a 70 or \$80 million total pot, and we know what belongs to the GFRDA

people, which I suggest to your Honor will be somewhere between 15 and \$20 million. The remainder belongs to the ATGF investors. And, therefore, one knows the ratio. Let me round off the numbers. If \$20 million belongs to the GFRDA investors and the total is 80, meaning 60 million belongs to ATGF, then the ratio of any distribution should be in the ratio of 25 percent, 20 over 80, to 75 percent.

And I respectfully submit, your Honor, that's the fair way to do the interim distribution. Obviously, there can be a true-up at the end, but I just want to emphasize as strongly as I possibly can that if the receiver's proposal, second proposal, amended proposal, is adopted by this Court for the interim distribution, the only way to do that is to completely ignore the difference between the two kinds of investment. And what the receiver would be doing is taking those GFRDA investors who are only entitled to principal and interest and giving them the upside of the equity investments made in ATGF because that's what happens if you treat everybody pro rata.

The receiver so far is treating everybody pro rata. That could change, but I respectfully submit, it is going to change if your Honor indicates that that's the right way to do it, as I believe you should indicate, even though this is only an interim distribution, because it's really much more than that.

With regard to the Mayers, I don't intend to say much.

It's in our papers. As your Honor knows, if you have reviewed the papers, we do not believe they are entitled to priority. We do not believe they get to jump to the front of the line. The relevant case law which we cite in paragraph 20 of our submission gives your Honor broad discretion to do fairness in this situation, and I respectfully submit that's what you should do.

With regard to the claim that Messrs. Vilar and Tanaka are somehow entitled to all of the appreciation since May of 2005, I don't think there is any basis for it. I think, in fact, it is hard to take seriously. What they would be saying is, once they shut down, once they were compelled to shut down Amerindo, suddenly the assets of the investments became their assets. It makes no sense.

Now, since May of 2005, the NASDAQ composite index, which we believe is a fair surrogate for the nature of these investments, has more than doubled. If your Honor thinks about it, what they are really claiming is that 50 percent of the value of the assets is theirs. And that's, as I said, very hard to take seriously. If my clients had invested in ATGF and the value of the ATGF securities went down, my clients and the other ATGF investors would bear that loss. No GFRDA fixed-income investor would say, I want to share in that loss, but yet they want to share in the upside.

THE COURT: It's not clear that they want to share in

the upside necessarily. We are really here for the interim distribution. But I take your point. I understand the difference between the two and the difference between their expectations.

MR. FRIEDMAN: I want to turn to something that no one has addressed and that's the work remaining to be done by the receiver. As I mentioned a moment ago, Mr. Gazes told me that there were about \$45 million in restricted securities and the problem is they are very volatile securities. If they were worth \$45 million when Mr. Gazes told that to me, they may be worth less today. We know what happened to the market yesterday with the reports from the Ukraine and China. There certainly were less today than they were yesterday, and my concern that those securities should be converted to cash as quickly as possible.

And I don't really quite understand why that hasn't been done yet and why it is taking so long to get those restrictions lifted. I don't think it is that complicated to get restrictions lifted, although my knowledge is less than complete in that regard.

But what I would ask your Honor to consider is giving the receiver whatever help he needs to get those restrictions lifted. And very often an order from this Court has tremendous persuasive power with transfer agents and other people who are in control about whether restrictions get lifted, and we would

all breathe more comfortably and have time for these interesting debates if we had cash instead of \$45 million in volatile securities.

So I would hope that your Honor aids Mr. Gazes in converting those securities to cash and in recovering the \$4 million from the Cayman Islands, which, again, is taking a long time, and I don't know why it's taking such a long time. I, like everybody in this room, do not want to stand in the way of an interim distribution, but, your Honor, I think you have to look at the bigger picture in determining the way to do that. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Friedman.

Let's hear from Mr. Swanson now.

MR. SWANSON: Thank you, your Honor. It was easier being a witness than speaking here.

Very quickly on a few points. We do not believe in any priority for the Mayers. We do not believe there should be any priority at this time for any class of investors. If there was to be a priority, Ms. Cates deserves it. She was the one who had \$5 million outright stolen from her.

THE COURT: Why would that give her a priority?

MR. SWANSON: It doesn't. I don't think any investor should have a priority. We do not believe that any excess should go to Messrs. Vilar and Tanaka.

If some day we see in excess -- is convicted of fraud,

we believe they should not get any benefits from what they did.

Sale of restricted securities should not be your problem. That is something I know about, and I hope the receiver will resolve that quickly.

We are fully in support of the receiver's motion and the SEC's motion supporting it. We thought they were both very well done with one exception. And the one exception is the claim with respect by my client with respect to her mother.

First of all, we filed our requests in two parts.

Ms. Shevitz filed an objection to it. The receiver e-mailed to me his intention to not support it based upon the documents at this time. However, we would ask the Court to approve it for the following reasons. First of all --

THE COURT: The it that you are referring to is -- MR. SWANSON: Anna Gladkoff, the mother.

First of all, as far as whether Lily would have received those funds, if the Court cares, I have a copy of the last will and testament of Anna Gladkoff, which I could deliver today or file subsequently, which shows that Lily is the only child and received everything. I don't think that's really an issue.

We would ask the judge to permit the late filing and consider the merits, either pro or con, despite the late filing.

Lily first remembered it in mid February. We looked

to see what documentation there was. We then filed a proof of claim on February 27 which was received on February 28. It was filed with the Court and it was filed with Mr. Gazes, and at the request of the Court's clerk we subsequently filed it electronically.

Ms. Cates had no memory of it until then. Her mother died in 2002. This is 2014. Lily, as Ms. Shevitz points out, referred to it in 2005 in her meeting with Mr. Litt, Mr. Salzman, and others.

I hope I got the name right. What can I say. I'm doing this without notes to go as quickly as possible and didn't remember it since.

She subsequently went looking to see if there were other documents. I'm trying to speak quickly to be fast, and so I may slip things.

When we filed on February 27, received 28th, we referred to a deposit with Amerindo in January of 2001. We provided with that filing a handwritten note from Heather at Amerindo. Ms. Shevitz pointed out in her objection that Heather was a part-time clerk there. And Heather says: We have received \$250,000 to invest in the name of Ms. Anna P. Gladkoff, care of Lily Cates. Copies of statements will be sent to her accountants, Bill Shine and Bob Carillo on a quarterly basis, Heather, and it's on Amerindo stationery.

This certainly supports the \$250,000 that was

delivered to Amerindo to January 2001 on behalf of Anna Gladkoff. Lily subsequently found a cancelled check which we delivered to the Court in March in our revised proof of claim. That check, which the Court has a copy of, is made out, it's from Anna Gladkoff, Lily Cates to Amerindo Investments and it says in the memo at the bottom: Amerindo B2B mutual fund. And on the backside it shows that it was deposited. There is actually a reference to a People's Heritage Bank, which I looked up and is in Maine. Ms. Cates does not have any accounts in Maine and it was written out to Amerindo Investments. So we have evidence that we have submitted of a second deposit. Actually, it was the first one in November of 2000 of \$300,000. So the total is \$550,000.

Now, Ms. Shevitz's objection is that there was a government note of a meeting on May 10 at which was attended Marc Litt, Cindy Fraterrigo, Kay Lackey and Mark Salzberg of the SEC. And in those notes it refers to the money being transferred to Lily. I have my own notes which I had forgotten about that at that meeting which are a bit more detailed. I'm happy to submit copies to the Court now or subsequently. And my notes refer to it. It goes on to say: First in mom's name, then into L's, Lily's name, at suggestion of Cashmere, who is the tax attorney for Lily and Lily's mother. Come separately, every quarter, not part of Lily's account. That was the testimony Lily gave in 2005 to Mr. Litt, Mr. Salzberg and

others, was that it was in a separate account, came in a separate statement.

Now, Lily doesn't remember any more if her name was on it or not, but it was not part of her account. And, in fact, Ms. Shevitz pointed out earlier today, if I can find my notes quickly enough, that everything is accounted for. If you look at the Amerindo statements for Lily Cates, there is nothing reflecting a \$300,000 deposit for a B2B or any other account in November 2000, and there is no indication in those statements of a deposit in January of 2001 into Lily Cates' Amerindo account.

Therefore, we believe that there is clear evidence that Amerindo received two payments on behalf of Anna Gladkoff, one in November for \$300,000, one in January of 2001 for \$250,000. Lily, although she saved everything under the sun, thousands of documents were turned over to the government in 2005. She does not have any statements that refer to her mother.

Now, we believe that since she, and as Mr. Gazes said, as long as the claimant gives evidence of payment to Amerindo, we gave credit. Well, here is evidence of payments to Amerindo, a total of \$550,000 to Amerindo. There is no evidence of it going into Lily Cates's account, coming out of an account to either Lily or Anna Gladkoff.

We believe until Amerindo or the receiver can find

evidence which we cannot find that shows our money was somewhere else, Lily, as the heir, sole heir of Anna Gladkoff, should be entitled to a claim, an additional claim for \$550,000. That is our only objection to the receiver's motion. And I thank your Honor for your patience.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Swanson.

Next, Ms. Colbath. You or Mr. Heitkonig wishes to speak?

MS. COLBATH: Yes, your Honor. My client wishes to address the Court directly.

THE COURT: Mr. Heitkonig, please come up.

MR. HEITKONIG: First of all, thank you very much, your Honor, for allowing me to address the Court both verbally and in the past through my written letters to you.

I am not going to repeat everything that I wrote in the last letter. I think that's clear.

One of the first questions you asked the receiver was, will the interim distribution affect the whole. And my worry is that there are several dubious claims. Ms. Shevitz mentioned the Charles claim. I believe I read that Soumendra Khain was a friend of Charles. There was also an account entitled National Investor Holdings, which was a Channel Island company which was struck from the register I think in 2007. Subsequently, another company claimed that the assets were passed to them, but nothing in the claim that was submitted

showed any evidence of that. And to add insult to injury, that's an account that would be getting \$127 per share of an ATGF account, when our proposed share price would be \$21. I would be very happy with half of that, \$63. But that's really a whole different play.

I really would like to cease accounts that had poor to no documentation thoroughly analyzed before an interim distribution. For example, the national investor holdings is, I think, a Saudi Arabia company. Charles, for example, I think he lives in Long Island. If it's found that he made a fraudulent claim, I am sure he will be dealt with by the justice system. But certain foreign companies, they would make away with monies that should go to the whole.

I just wanted to also touch upon the ATGF custodian.

I don't understand why the custodian hasn't been investigated or they must bear some guilt in this. At least if nothing else, their record should bear some light on the accounting situation. Ms. Shevitz did say this afternoon that the accounts are not in disarray and if they were just looked at, everyone would realize that. I would certainly favor that funds be awarded or be made available out of our custodial fund for the receiver to continue to investigate these funds. I think that's very necessary. And pleased that anything that looks fraudulent or iffy to be put aside before an interim distribution is made. Because once that's done, if the account

was fraudulent, this could be several million dollars that are done that should be part of the whole.

There is one account in particular which I think illustrates this point. There is a small account entitled Imagineers Profit Sharing plan. And these were a very honest and meticulous group. They had withdrawals in August and December of 2004. They presented that as part of their claim, which goes on to show that you have certain claims where the documents were from 1999 or even prior to that, in 2000, so on and so forth.

That's really the point. I thank you for allowing me to come up here and that's really --

And, finally, I was saddened to hear that Dr. Mayer has passed on. I just mention that as a human component to this situation. I can't imagine what it's like for him to leave us without knowing that his funds were safe. My mom is elderly. I hope that doesn't happen to her.

Again, your Honor, thank you so much for allowing me to address the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Heitkonig. I appreciate your taking the time to be here.

Ms. Buchanan, you wish to be heard?

MS. BUCHANAN: Good afternoon. I promise to be the briefest one here.

My one concern is that we have not yet seen their

revised calculations from the receiver, as he discussed earlier. And we just ask that Ms. Sayko be treated as all other GFRDA investors are being treated in however the Court decides to calculate their interim distributions. That's really my only concern.

THE COURT: You definitely win for being the shortest.

Thank you very much, Ms. Buchanan.

Is there anyone who I have not heard from who wished to speak that I overlooked, for whatever reason?

Mr. Gazes, it's your motion. As I customarily do in an oral argument, I'll give you an opportunity to respond to the various points that have been made.

MS. SHEVITZ: Judge, I would like to respond briefly to some new points that were just made.

THE COURT: No. I'm sorry, Ms. Shevitz. I think -- MS. SHEVITZ: For instance, Mr. Swanson --

THE COURT: When I say no, that doesn't mean yes, go ahead and talk over me. I don't know how to say that without pointing out sort of basic lessons of civility, but you don't get to do that, so no.

Go ahead, Mr. Gazes.

MR. GAZES: Thank you, your Honor. I don't want to belabor the points with regard to those issues raised by Mr. Begos. I think my papers set out fully the basis from which we think they should not be given some priority elevation

so that their claim is somewhat secured against the accounts.

I think your Honor clearly understands that.

I think the most difficult issue that faced me in particular with regard to determining how to value these claims is, where is the money really coming from to provide for an interim distribution. And so I only could look to basically one account, an account known as ATGF II. For me to become a money manager now and start calculating what a GFRDA claimant should have received or what an ATGF claimant should receive when I have no specific investment vehicle to look to to determine an appreciated value, I found it very difficult. There were many scenarios that we looked at. My accountant is here today to tell you that we must have gone through many configurations on how these monies should be disbursed.

The bottom line is, the funds were commingled. There is no specific investment vehicle for me to identify so that I can pay the GFRDA an interest amount, and there is no specific vehicle that I can pay an ATGF investor, because I don't know what their investments were. Remember, my funds are in ATGF II.

If I followed everybody's reasoning, we would all be right back where my proposed interim distribution is. Since I only have one pot of money in an account that's not identifiable or traceable to any one specific investor, it's clear that everything was commingled. We have to treat them

similarly because I don't have any differentiating fund to say, okay, this pot would go to GFRDA and this pot goes to ATGF.

That's why we came up with this scenario. We thought it would be most fair to pool it for an interim purpose, and I do emphasize it is interim, because I cannot discern haw to treat everybody. I'm not a money manager. My job is to figure out what is the best-case scenario to get everybody back at least now some portion of what they invested. People provided statements that were scant. Some didn't get any statements.

Some got statements over a course of years and in a lot of years did not get any statements at all. Allegations of funds being used for purposes of paying a GFRDA investor while utilizing ATGF investment funds. I believe that they are true, but I have no certainty of that.

Yes, we could have conducted a forensic examination of whatever books and records exist well into six figures at cost, well into over a year to figure out. I have 30 years of experience in back-drafting books and records on companies that we investigate and it takes a long time to figure out with no certainty that the books and records ultimately will tell us what the answers are.

Furthermore, it's the criminal defendants who created the books and records. So how reliable are those books and records going to be for me? How can I say that a particular investor in a GFRDA account, whose money is now in ATGF II,

somewhat belongs to them, and I should attribute an interest rate from that account, which may be prejudicial to an ATGF investor whose money is also in the ATGF II account.

Bottom line is, the fairest and the best way to treat everybody for this interim purpose and to get money out the door, which I know everybody here supports other than the defendants, who say to the contrary, but I don't agree, is to treat it as a pooling method, give everybody back a portion of what we believe their claim is, and move on to the next step.

The reason why the five or six public securities who were listed as private securities have not been sold at this point is because they are restricted. And you have to go through an agent of the company to get the restrictions lifted and you have to have an entity that's going to sell those stocks for you once they are lifted. I've been in discussions with JP Morgan. They have given me a fee structure where they are willing to go out and lift the restrictions for me and then sell the shares for me. We have sold the Sirius shares and brought in almost 7 or \$8 million. That's the direction we are heading in for the five or six public securities.

I've been on hold with the balance of the private securities because it's an enormous amount of money to sell them. They are not readily saleable on the public market. You have to go through a secondary market and not many people are willing to do it. I've been to five financial institutions

besides JP Morgan to open up accounts for the purposes of liquidating the balance of the securities. All have declined to take these accounts on, and for various reasons. Mostly for compliance and regulation reasons.

I have no further comments with regard to the specific objections. I believe I've addressed them in my papers and the SEC has addressed them. I don't believe that the claims appear to be questionable at this time. I could, if the Court is inclined, get a declaration from each of the claimants that the claims are all under penalty of perjury, if that would somewhat satisfy some of the parties here in terms of the validity of the claims. Other than that, most of the claimants have produced documentation in the most part to document what their claim is, and I believe that those claims are valid.

With regard to Lily Cates's mother, I didn't state that the claim wasn't valid. I said I just didn't have enough time to make a determination as to its allowability. And I think it should just be pushed off for the moment so that we can see if we can come up with further information with regard to that claim.

THE COURT: When you say pushed off for the moment, you mean pushed off until after the interim distribution?

MR. GAZES: Pushed off until the next distribution, and if we can discover in any way the allowability of the claim. I just can't do that on such short notice.

Allow

1 THE COURT: You would say after the initial 2 distribution? 3 MR. GAZES: Your Honor, we need to get money out the The allowability of that claim for \$550,000 should hold 4 door. 5 up the entire distribution at this time. 6 THE COURT: The point you made, the point before this 7 one, about the valuation for the sale of the securities that remain held and that would require a secondary market, that's 8 9 something that will have to be addressed, not just for purposes 10 of the interim distribution. 11 MR. GAZES: That's correct, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Gazes. 13 I am going to reserve on this, but not for very long. 14 I am going to rule on the motion within the next couple of 15 weeks, and we will then hopefully start getting money out the door to people who have been waiting a long time. 16 17 I want to thank everyone for being here today and 18 thank you for making the submissions that you made. I will certainly take into consideration everything that was said and 19 20 everything that was submitted and then I'll be in touch. 21 Ms. Shevitz. 22 MS. SHEVITZ: Could I have five minutes to talk to my 23 clients? 24 THE COURT: Yeah, five minutes.

Marshals, that's okay? I think that's fair.

25

Ms. Shevitz to speak to her clients for five minutes or so before they are taken out. That's fine. Thanks. Have a good day. Ms. Shevitz, I hope your arm is better and everyone have a good weekend. Thanks.